What is Philosophy

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

Pythagoras was supposedly the first to call himself a philosopher. In coining this designation he intended to use it literally: the philosopher is a 'lover of wisdom'. Two implications have remained true of subsequent philosophy. First, it involves one in a persistent and resolute quest that refuses to be satisfied with glib answers and oversimplified solutions. Second, its goal of wisdom, 'sophia', brooks neither idle curiosity nor a coldly impersonal amassing of irrelevant information. Rather, it is concerned with man's basic questions because they bear on his attainment to 'the good life', regardless of whether this good is to be found in the study of ultimate reality, in understanding man, in knowing God, or in a life of responsible citizenship.

The popular concept of a 'philosophy of life' makes sense in this context. It suggests a reflective outlook which controls our reactions to life's vicissitudes and guides our choices between its innumerable paths. In kindred fashion we speak of taking reverses 'philosophically', that is to say, with a patience born of mature reflection upon all that life offers.

These, however, are popular rather than technical usages. While they illustrate the combination of thoughtful reflection and practical concern, they are still more representative of the home-spun ideas of the man-in-the-street than of the interests of the professional philosopher.

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is characterized not so much by its distinctive subject-matter as by its objectives and methods. The ancients included all known disciplines within the general pale of philosophy, and less than a century ago the natural sciences were still called 'natural philosophy'. It must not be supposed, therefore, that present-day philosophers are unconcerned about the subject-matter of other disciplines. They are concerned with it, however, in a different way from the physical or social scientists. They are concerned with the critical examination of scientific methods, of general concepts that arise or are assumed, of the interrelationship of various disciplines.

The professional philosopher has customarily pursued either or both of two objectives that have crystallized since the days of Pythagoras. These are first a comprehensive world view and second clarity of understanding.

1. The quest for a comprehensive world view is the aspect of philosophy most in question in discussions of its bearing on religion. Sometimes called systematic or speculative philosophy it suggests a carefully developed coherent explanation of the nature of God, man and the universe that embraces as far as possible all the known interrelationships that arise. Comparatively few philosophers have succeeded in working out enduring world views. The names of Aristotle and Hegel stand as two of the greatest by virtue of both their encyclopaedic and their systematizing work.

The very quest for a world view raises problems which have not escaped the penetrating vision of the less venturesome. The scope of human knowledge is at best limited and even the vast mass of scientific insight accumulated since the Renaissance seems likely to be but a tiny glimpse of otherwise unimagined vistas. Even the trustworthiness of human knowledge is open to question: social ideologies and scientific hypotheses alike suffer emendation; a man's understanding is inevitably relative to his position in space and his perspective in history. It is open to debate whether man will ever apprehend more than passing phenomena that deceptively shadow unknowable realities. Is it any wonder it is argued that world-views come and go with their respective cultures reflecting as they must a changing Zeitgeist (spirit of the age)? A truly comprehensive world and life view presupposes the humanly impossible - the viewpoints and abilities of deity.

Inevitably therefore the systematic philosopher cannot claim to have developed a final and exhaustive world view. But he can lay claim to the quest for a system that builds upon lessons from the past and upon present intimations of the future. He makes a persistent attempt to see life as totally and as steadily as is humanly possible, an attempt that admits of fallible interpretations and unsolved problems, yet strives constantly for that self-consistency which is the hall-mark of truth.

Even this fails to satisfy modern objectors. What is known must be intelligible, and if intelligible then communicable. Is human language adequate to this task? Can logic, syntax and verbal symbols capture and convey the unity and diversity of those multidimensioned realities that lie around man and beyond? Or must man forgo the right to anything which evades statistical and experimental procedures? The quest for a world-view today supposes that questions such as these have been satisfactorily answered. It is little wonder that in most philosoph1cal circles logically prior issues such as these dominate the scene that philosophy's second objective has risen to the fore.

2 The quest for clarity of understanding is by no means the innovation of twentieth century philosophical analysts. While it is true that the antimetaphysical temper of the contemporary mind has served to re-emphasize problems of meaning, to some extent conceptual logical or linguistic analysis and criticism have been the perennial concern of philosophers. Socrates was a classic example; with his renowned dialectical method he sought for unambiguous expression based on a clear understanding of questions and concepts. The Socratic dialogues are masterpieces of analysis brilliantly probing minds in the quest for meaning and truth.

By the same token it is significant that Socrates stimulated the more systematic genius of Plato and Aristotle. The clarification of individual questions introduced still others and these in turn raised issues of a more general and inclusive nature. Analysis became the prelude to system building. So it has been since. Scholastic analyses of questions regarding God and man, nature and grace, produced the neo-Aristotelian system of Thomas Aquinas. Enlightenment analyses of the problem of knowledge stimulated by the growth of physical sc1ences generated the world-views of the nineteenth century.

The quests for clarity and consistency, then, go hand in hand. If consistency is the logical desideratum of a world-view then clarity is the rational desideratum of the quest for understanding. Other requirements may indeed be involved of an empirical, psychological or even cultural nature but in these two desiderata one finds indispensable criteria of the rational. Philosophy as a rational activity pursues both clarity and consistency. Its quest is for both a lucid understanding and a comprehensive world-view. It is for this reason that either deliberately or unintentionally obscured notions are as objectionable as ultimate self-contradictions. It is for this reason also that philosophy can claim to be a legitimate enterprise: its objectives are essentially those of all rational beings.

It should be recognized however that philosophy remains a quest. As long as man's insight is finite elements of mystery are liable to shroud his otherwise clear understanding. He may probe the data and analyse both concepts and language, but he does so in the quest for a degree of clarity that for the present remains elusive. In addition, as long as the scope of man's knowledge is limited, and as long as his systematic reasoning must employ guiding hypotheses and basic presuppositions which admit of no demonstrative certainty, the possibility of error threatens an otherwise consistent position. He may include a greater scope of learning, may reassess his presuppositions and check his logic, but he does so still in the quest for the kind of a system that for the present eludes him. Philosophy is a quest with which dogmatism, cynicism, and obscurantism are all equally incompatible.

THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

The philosophical quest may be legitimate, but does it serve any useful purpose in society? To the man-in-the-street, and for the religious seeking to develop a working relationship to philosophy, the question is crucial. A legitimate but valueless enterprise can merit little respect.

Philosophy is but one phase of human culture. Culture as a whole is the developed pattern of human life as it centres around certain key values. Philosophy seeks to clarify this value-structure and to express it in a systematic world-and-life-view. It is culture becoming self-critical and systematically reflective. It is a process of intellectual maturation analogous to that of individuals. The child who cries for the moon wants the yellow ball he sees on the roof of the house next door. The adolescent laughs at his little brother, but finds in the full moon a stimulus to romance and an occasion for fun. The adult, however, sees an object of aesthetic enjoyment or scientific investigation. Intellectual maturation, whether in the individual or in the group, involves a refining of ideas, a re-expression of ideals, a careful sifting of naive notions. Childhood assumptions give way to adolescent attitudes, and these in turn develop into adult viewpoints.

In a maturing culture philosophy provides an intellectual conscience to probe existing thought-patterns, and it develops an over-all world-view as a guide in the processes and conflicts of history.

Socrates exemplifies the first function of philosophy, that of an intellectual conscience for society. Disgusted by political intrigue, concerned about moral relativism, alarmed at signs of cultural disintegration, he sought to expose underlying confusions of mind, to force the development of clear ideas, to encourage the pursuit of true values. In rejecting Socrates, Athens repressed its intellectual conscience. Subsequent philosophers have to various extents served the same function. Philosophical criticism compelled the early Church to clarify its understanding of the Trinity. Philosophical insistence on a clear understanding of man forced the development of Renaissance political theories which moulded democratic ideals. Intellectual confusion is a hazard to the whole of human society, a hazard against which the quest for clear understanding stands guard.

The philosopher-king of Plato's Republic illustrates the second cultural function of philosophy, the development of a guiding world-view. Plato supposes that the reflective individual, who has gained for himself a clear understanding of true values, will have gained a proper perspective on the down-to-earth issues of daily life. He will approach decisions neither emotively nor with a partisan spirit, but in the light of his over-all view of man and his place in the universe. His world-view will enable him to rule well.

This ideal admittedly did not prove too practicable. Contingent circumstances, political intrigue, and corruption paid scanty respect to Plato's lofty idealism. Yet he touched upon the indubitable fact that a developed world-view is an indispensable guide not only for the individual but also for society. It is philosophy which provides world-views. In content and acceptability they vary. Marx and Nietzsche, Dewey and Hegel, Locke and Rousseau, Augustine and Aquinas, each has moulded history by developing ideologies that guided culture.

Philosophy, then, is a momentous undertaking that cannot be ignored and must not be underestimated.